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Abstract
We present a model of stereotypes based on Kahneman and Tversky’s representative-
ness heuristic. A decision maker assesses a target group by overweighting its representative
types, defined as the types that occur more frequently in that group than in a baseline ref-
erence group. Stereotypes formed in this way contain a “kernel of truth”: they are rooted in
true differences between groups. Because stereotypes focus on differences, they cause belief
distortions, particularly when groups are similar. Stereotypes are also context dependent:
beliefs about a group depend on the characteristics of the reference group. In line with our
predictions, beliefs in the lab about abstract groups and beliefs in the field about political
groups are context dependent and distorted in the direction of representative types. JEL:
D03, D83, D84. C91.
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1 Introduction
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a stereotype as a “widely held but fixed and oversim-
plified image or idea of a particular type of person or thing”. Stereotypes are ubiquitous.
Among other things, they cover racial groups (“Asians are good at math”), political groups
(“Republicans are rich”), genders (“Women are bad at math”), demographic groups (“Florida
residents are elderly”), and situations (“Tel-Aviv is dangerous”). As these and other examples
illustrate, some stereotypes are roughly accurate (“the Dutch are tall”), while others much
less so (“Irish are red-headed”; only 10% are). Moreover, stereotypes change: in the US, Jews
were stereotyped as religious and uneducated at the beginning of the 20th century, and as
high achievers at the beginning of the 21st (Madon et. al., 2001).
Social science has produced three broad approaches to stereotypes. The economic ap-
proach of Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) sees stereotypes as a manifestation of statistical
discrimination: rational formation of beliefs about a group member in terms of the aggregate
distribution of group traits. Statistical discrimination may impact actual group characteris-
tics in equilibrium (Arrow 1973), but even so stereotypes are based on rational expectations.1
As such, these models do not address the central problem that stereotypes are often inac-
curate. The vast majority of Florida residents are not elderly, the vast majority of the Irish
are not red-headed, and Tel-Aviv is really pretty safe.
The sociological approach to stereotyping pertains only to social groups. It views stereo-
types as fundamentally incorrect and derogatory generalizations of group traits, reflective of
the stereotyper’s underlying prejudices (Adorno et al. 1950) or other internal motivations
(Schneider 2004). Social groups that have been historically mistreated, such as racial and
ethnic minorities, continue to suffer through bad stereotyping, perhaps because the groups
in power want to perpetuate false beliefs about them (Steele 2010, Glaeser 2005). The
stereotypes against blacks are thus rooted in the history of slavery and continuing discrim-
ination. This approach might be relevant in some important instances, but it leaves a lot
out. While some stereotypes are inaccurate, many are quite fair (“Dutch are tall,” “Swedes
1More recent work explores under what conditions stereotypes are self-fulfilling. Assuming that freely
available information is used correctly, minorities can invest in visible signals of quality that offset preconcep-
tions (Lundberg and Startz 1983). Glover et al (2015) present evidence on self-fulfilling aspects of stereotypes
in labor markets.
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are blond.”) Moreover, many stereotypes are flattering to the group in question rather than
pejorative (“Asians are good at math”). Finally, stereotypes change, so they are at least in
part responsive to reality rather than entirely rooted in the past (Madon et. al., 2001).
The third approach to stereotypes – and the one we follow – is the “social cognition
approach”, rooted in social psychology (Schneider 2004). This approach gained ground in
the 1980’s and views social stereotypes as special cases of cognitive schemas or theories
(Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth 1979). These theories are intuitive generalizations that
individuals routinely use in their everyday life, and entail savings on cognitive resources.
Hilton and Hippel (1996) define stereotypes as “mental representations of real differences
between groups [. . . ] allowing easier and more efficient processing of information. Stereotypes
are selective, however, in that they are localized around group features that are the most
distinctive, that provide the greatest differentiation between groups, and that show the least
within-group variation.” A related “kernel-of-truth hypothesis” holds that stereotypes are
based on some empirical reality; as such, they are useful, but may entail exaggerations
(Judd and Park 1993).
We show that this approach to stereotypes is intimately related to another idea from
psychology: the use of heuristics in probability judgments (Kahneman and Tversky 1972).
Just as heuristics simplify the assessment of complex probabilistic hypotheses, they also sim-
plify the representation of heterogeneous groups, sometimes causing errors in judgment. We
formally explore this idea by modelling stereotype formation as a consequence of Kahneman
and Tversky’s representativeness heuristic. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) write that “an
attribute is representative of a class if it is very diagnostic; that is, the relative frequency of
this attribute is much higher in that class than in the relevant reference class.” Following
Gennaioli and Shleifer (GS 2010), we assume that a type t is representative for group G
relative to a comparison group −G if - in line with the Tversky and Kahneman definition -
it scores high on the likelihood ratio:
Pr(t|G)
Pr(t| −G) . (1)
The most representative types come to mind first, and so are overweighted in judg-
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ments. Predictions about G are then made under a distorted distribution, or stereotype,
that overweights representative types. Our results obtain with minimal assumptions on such
overweighting. We describe a number of weighting specifications and explore their properties.
To illustrate the logic of the model, consider the stereotype “Florida residents are elderly”.
The proportion of elderly people in Florida and in the overall US population is shown below.2
age 0− 19 20− 44 45− 64 65+
Florida 24.0% 31.7% 27.0% 17.4%
US 26.9% 33.6% 26.4% 13.1%
The table shows that the age distributions in Florida and in the rest of the US are very
similar. Yet, someone over 65 is highly representative of a Florida resident, because this age
bracket maximizes the likelihood ratio Pr(t|Florida)/Pr(t|US). When thinking about the age
of Floridians, then, the “65+” type immediately comes to mind because in this age bracket
Florida is most different from the rest of the US, in the precise sense of representativeness.
Representativeness-based recall induces an observer to overweight the “65+” type in his
assessment of the average age of Floridians.
This example also illustrates how stereotypes can be inaccurate. Indeed, and perhaps
surprisingly, only about 17% of Florida residents are elderly. The largest share of Florida
residents, nearly as many as in the overall US population, are in the age bracket “19-44”,
which maximizes Pr(t|Florida). Being elderly is not the most likely age bracket for Florida
residents, but rather the age bracket that occurs with the highest relative frequency. A
stereotype-based prediction that a Florida resident is elderly has very little validity.
The same logic of representativeness suggests that the reason people stereotype the Irish
as red-headed is that red hair is more common among the Irish than among other groups, even
though it is not that common in absolute terms. The reason people stereotype Republicans
as wealthy is that the wealthy are more common among Republicans than Democrats.3 In
both cases, the representation entails judgment errors: people overestimate the proportion
of red-haired among the Irish, or of the wealthy among the Republicans.
2Data from the 2010 US Census, see http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.
xhtml?pid=DEC_10_DP_DPDP1&src=pt.
3See www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20041107_px_ELECTORATE.xls.
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We find that representativeness often generates fairly accurate stereotypes but sometimes
causes stereotypes to be inaccurate, particularly when groups have similar distributions that
differ most in unlikely types. More generally, our model highlights two critical properties:
• Stereotypes amplify systematic differences between groups, even if these differences
are in reality very small. When groups differ by a shift in means, stereotyping ex-
aggerates differences in means, and when groups differ by an increase in variance,
stereotyping exaggerates the differences in variances. In these cases (but not always),
representativeness yields stereotypes that contain a “kernel of truth”, in the sense that
they differentiate groups along existing and highly diagnostic characteristics, exactly
as Hilton, Hippel and Schneider define them.
• Stereotypes are context dependent. The assessment of a given target group depends
on the reference group to which it is compared.
In line with the social cognition approach to stereotypes, a significant body of psycholog-
ical research on beliefs about gender, race, age, and political groups finds that stereotypes
broadly reflect reality but also display biases. Social psychologists have explored the extent
to which stereotypes exaggerate real differences, thus possessing a “kernel of truth”. Evidence
on exaggeration varies by domain. For race and gender, many studies have reported roughly
accurate beliefs, while others have found underestimation or exaggeration of true differences
(Jussim et al 2015).4 For age and political stereotypes, evidence points more strongly to-
ward exaggeration.5 Schneider (2004) summarizes the existing empirical work on stereotype
accuracy as follows: “the best we can do by way of general summary is to say that some
stereotypes held by some people for some groups are sometimes accurate”. Our empirical
investigation explores the connection between stereotype accuracy and representativeness,
which we measure using the previously defined likelihood ratio.
4For evidence of roughly accurate beliefs for race, see, for example, Ashton and Esses (1999) on be-
liefs of academic ability, Kaplowitz et al (2003) on income, poverty rates, and out-of-wedlock births, and
Wolsko, Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink (2000) on a array of positive and negative attributes. Ryan (1996)
and Gilens (1996) find evidence of exaggeration of race stereotypes on personal attributes and on poverty
rates respectively. Some studies have found roughly accurate beliefs on gender (Briton and Hall 1995, Mc-
Cauley, Thangavelu, and Rozin 1988, and Diekman, Eagly, and Kulesa 2002), while others find evidence of
exaggeration (Martin 1987, Beyer 1999).
5See Chan et al (2014) on age. We discuss evidence on political stereotypes in Section 4.
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We first assess the role of representativeness and context dependence in the lab. We
construct a group of mundane objects, G, and present it to participants next to a comparison
group, −G. In our baseline condition, the comparison group is chosen so that no type
is particularly representative of group G. In our treatment, we change the comparison
group, −G, while leaving the target group, G, unchanged. The new comparison group
gives rise to highly representative types within G. In line with the key prediction of our
model, participants in the treatment condition shift their assessment of G toward the new
representative types.
We next test the model using two data sets on political preferences, and beliefs about
political preferences, in the U.S. Here, groups are political constituencies (Democrats and
Republicans) and types are their positions on a number of issues. Holding fixed the groups
and the set of types, and varying the groups’ true distributions across issues, the data allow
us to test whether beliefs about political preferences are shaped by representativeness. We
first show that such beliefs depart from the truth by exaggerating (mean) differences, as
per the kernel of truth logic. We then explore how the extent of exaggeration varies across
issues. Consistent with the model, we find that beliefs systematically depart from rational
expectations and that the degree to which they exaggerate true differences is a function
of representativeness. While representativeness is not the only heuristic that shapes recall
(availability, driven by recency or frequency of exposure, also plays a role), it explains the
fact that, in the data, stated beliefs indeed exaggerate differences among groups.
Since Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972, 1973) work on heuristics and biases, several stud-
ies have formally modelled heuristics about probabilistic judgments and incorporated them
into economic models. Work on the confirmation bias (Rabin and Schrag 1999) and on
probabilistic extrapolation (Grether 1980, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998, Rabin 2002,
Rabin and Vayanos 2010, Benjamin, Rabin and Raymond 2011) assumes that the decision
maker has an incorrect model in mind or incorrectly processes available data. Our ap-
proach is instead based on the assumption that representative information comes foremost
to mind when making judgments. The mental operation that lies at the heart of our model
– generating a prediction for the distribution of types in a group, based on data stored in
memory – also captures base-rate neglect and overreaction to diagnostic information. The
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underweighting or neglect of information in our model simplifies judgment problems in a
way related to models of categorization (Mullainathan 2002, Fryer and Jackson 2008). In
these models, however, decision makers use coarse categories organized according to likeli-
hood, not representativeness. This approach generates imprecision but does not create a
systematic bias for overestimating unlikely events, nor does it allow for context dependent
beliefs. In our empirical analysis of political beliefs, we explicitly compare the predictions of
representativeness-based recall to those of likelihood based models and find that the evidence
supports the former.
In modeling representativeness we follow the specification of GS (2010), but investigate
a new set of questions. GS (2010) examine how representativeness distorts the assessed
probabilities of alternative hypotheses, but not how the probability of a given hypothesis or
group is distributed across its constituent elements. In the context of the current setting,
GS (2010) ask how imperfect recall affects the assessed probability that a randomly drawn
member from a universe Ω belongs to group G. The current paper, in contrast, asks which
type t we expect to draw once we know that we are facing group G. GS (2010) show
how representativeness generates biased probabilistic assessments such as conjunction and
disjunction fallacies. The current paper deals with perhaps a broader and more ubiquitous
problem of stereotype formation, extensively studied by other social scientists but largely
neglected by economists.
Section 2 describes our model. In Section 3 we examine the properties of stereotypes,
including the forces that shape stereotype accuracy, and illustrate these properties with ex-
amples. In Section 4 we bring the model to the data, performing a lab experiment and
analyzing existing surveys of political beliefs. Section 5 concludes. The Online Appendix
presents proofs, a number of extensions of the model, and additional results for the experi-
ments and field evidence.
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2 A Model of Representativeness and Stereotypes
2.1 The Model
A decision maker (DM) faces a prediction problem, such as assessing the ability of a job
candidate coming from a certain ethnic group, the future performance of a firm belonging
to a certain sector, or future earnings based on own gender.
Formally, there is a set of types of interest T and an overall population Ω, of which group
G is a subset. The set of types T can be unordered (e.g., occupations) or ordered (and
typically cardinal, e.g., earnings levels). When T is ordered, we write T = {t1, . . . , tT} with
t1 < t2 < ... < tT .6 There is a probability or frequency distribution pi ∈ ∆ (T × Ω), that
induces a conditional distribution Pr(T = t |G) when restricted to G.7 In what follows, we
denote by pit,G = Pr(T = t |G) the probability of type t in group G and by piG the vector
(pit,G)t∈T containing the conditional distribution.
The DM’s goal is to assess the distribution of the types of interest in a particular group
G. While the DM has stored in memory the full distribution, he retrieves from memory
a distorted version of piG that overweights the probability of those types that are most
representative of G relative to a comparison group −G. Generically, −G is a group in Ω
that is distinct from G, namely −G ⊆ Ω\G, although in some cases it can coincide with the
complement of G.
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1983), a type t is representative of G if it is rela-
tively more likely to occur inG than in−G. Definitions 1 and 2 formalize this representativeness-
based recall, following GS (2010).
Definition 1 The representativeness of type t for group G given comparison group −G is
6For simplicity, we also use T to denote the number of types |T |. The model applies also to cases in which
types: i) are multi-dimensional, capturing a bundle of attributes such as occupation and nationality, or ii)
are continuous. We consider these cases in Appendices C and D respectively. Also, G may represent any
category of interest, such as the historical performance of a firm or industry, actions available to a decision
maker (T = set of payoffs, G = occupations), or categories in the natural world (T = ability to fly, G =
birds).
7In many applications each individual in Ω is characterized by a deterministic type (e.g. age, hair color,
etc). As a result, pi(t, ω) = 1/ |Ω|. For instance, each Floridian has a single age type (at the finest temporal
resolution). When instead types are stochastic, such as when estimating future earnings of a person or a
firm, each individual is described by a non-degenerate distribution.
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defined as the likelihood ratio:
R(t, G,−G) ≡ pit,G
pit,−G
. (2)
Definition 1 implies that DMs are attuned to log differences in probabilities: represen-
tativeness depends on the percentage probability increase of a type from −G to G. This
captures a form of diminishing sensitivity, whereby, for a fixed probability difference, a type
is more likely to be overweighed if it is unlikely in the comparison group.8 Thus, the repre-
sentative age of a Floridian is 65+ because people in this age bracket are more common in
Florida than in the rest of the US. Statistically, representative types are also diagnostic of
the target group G. Indeed, the higher is R(t, G,−G), the more confident is a Bayesian DM
observing t that t belongs to G rather than to −G.9
The ease of recall of highly representative types affects judgments because more eas-
ily recalled types are overweighted. We model distorted recall as follows. Denote by
R(t, G,−G) ≡ (pit,G/pit,−G)t∈T the vector of representativeness of all types in G. We then
have:
Definition 2 The DM attaches to each type t ∈ T in group G a distorted probability:
pistt,G = pit,G
ht(R(t, G,−G))∑
s∈T pis,Ghs(R(t, G,−G))
, (3)
where ht : RT+ → R+ is a weighting function such that:
1) The weight ht is a symmetric function of the representativeness of types s 6= t. For-
mally, ht = h
(
pit,G
pit,−G
;
(
pis,G
pis,−G
)
s∈T\{t}
)
where h : R+ × RT−1+ → R+ is a function that is
invariant to a permutation of the last T − 1 arguments.
2) Weighing of a type increases in own representativeness and decreases in the representa-
tiveness of other types. Formally, the function h(·) is weakly increasing in its first argument,
8Our definition of representativeness links to Weber’s law of sensory perception, see Section 2.2. It also
links to our previous work on salience, in which we postulated that log differences in payoffs determine
the attention to lottery payoffs, Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012) and to goods’ attributes (Bordalo,
Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2013). Equation (2) establishes the same principle for the domain of probabilities.
9This insight led Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001) to define representativeness as individuals’ sense, as
intuitive Bayesians, of updating in reaction to data. Their definition, like ours, is in terms of the likelihood
ratio. However, Tenenbaum and Griffiths interpret representativeness as a mechanism that affects intuitive
judgments of similarity, rather than beliefs (e.g. it accounts well for lab evidence where subjects are asked
to rank types in terms of representativeness, or of strength of association with a group.) Accordingly, they
do not consider the possibility of systematically distorted, and context dependent, beliefs.
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and weakly decreasing in the other T − 1 arguments.
We call the distribution (pistt,G)t∈T the stereotype for G. If a type t is objectively more
likely, namely pit,G is higher, then the stereotype attaches higher probability to it. By prop-
erty 1), distortions are due exclusively to the the fact that a type is more or less representative
than the others. In particular, if all types are equally representative, the DM equally weighs
all of them at h(1) and holds rational expectations about G. If instead the representativeness
of different types differs, property 2) implies that the stereotype ceteris paribus overweights
the probability of more representative types.
Most of the results we explore in this paper hold for a general weighing function ht(·). Spe-
cific functional forms capture added assumptions about the psychology of representativeness-
based recall, and are useful in applications. We outline a few specifications and their prop-
erties.
• Rank-based stereotypes: the ranking of the representativeness of different types shapes
distortions. Denote by r(t) ∈ {1, ..., T} the representativeness ranking of type t. When
r(t) = 1 type t is the most representative one (potentially with ties). We can specify
two ways in which a type’s representativeness ranking distorts its probability.
– Rank-based truncation: the DM only recalls the types that have representative-
ness ranking of at most d, namely {t ∈ T |r(t) ≤ d}. Zero probability is attached
to the remaining types.10 Denote by I(r(t) ≤ d) an indicator function taking
value 1 if the representativeness ranking of t is at most d. Then, the weighting
function is ht = I(r(t) ≤ d) so that:
pistt,G = pit,G
I(r(t) ≤ d)∑
s∈T pis,GI(r(s) ≤ d)
,
which is the true conditional probability within recalled types. This assumption
10These neglected types are not viewed as impossible; they are just assigned zero probability in the DM’s
current thinking. This formulation allows us to model surprise and reactions to unforeseen contingencies,
which have proved useful ingredients in modeling probabilistic judgments (GS 2010) as well as neglect of
risk in financial crises (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny 2012).
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is used in Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010).11
– Rank-based discounting: The DM discounts by a constant factor δ ∈ [0, 1] the odds
of type t relative to its immediate predecessors in the representativeness ranking.
Lower δ implies stronger discounting of less representative types. Formally, the
weighting function is ht = δr(t), so that:
pistt,G = pit,G
δr(t)∑
s∈T pis,Gδ
r(s)
.
• Representativness based discounting: All else equal, the weight attached by the DM to
type t increases continuously with its representativeness. One convenient formulation
is ht = (pit,G/pit,−G)
θ so that:
pistt,G = pit,G
(pit,G/pit,−G)
θ∑
s∈T pis,G (pis,G/pis,−G)
θ
,
where θ ≥ 0 captures the extent to which representativeness distorts beliefs. This
formulation is particularly convenient when dealing with continuous distribution of
the exponential or power classes.
These functional forms all embody the main idea of our model that the stereotype over-
weights the probability of more representative types. Rank-based truncation captures a
central manifestation of limited memory: forgetting unrepresentative types. Smoother dis-
counting (based on ranking or on representativeness) may be more appropriate when the
type space is small, and smooth discounting can be more tractable in certain settings.
Section 3 characterizes the general properties of stereotypes. In particular, it shows their
ability to account for social psychologists’s “kernel of truth” hypothesis under the general
weighting function of Definition 2. To bring the model to the data in Section 4.2, we derive
linear approximations of stereotypical beliefs by assuming that the weighting function is
11Specifically, in GS (2010) the assessed probability that a certain hypothesis G is true is equal to:
Pr(G) =
∑
t pit,GI(r(t) ≤ d)∑
t pit,GI(r(t) ≤ d) +
∑
t pit,Ω/GI(r(t) ≤ d)
which increases in the ratio between the total probability mass recalled forG and that recalled for −G = Ω\G.
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differentiable with respect to a type’s representativeness. This assumption excludes rank-
based weighting but allows for many possibilities.
2.2 Discussion of Assumptions
Before moving to the formal analysis, we discuss some properties as well as limitations of our
approach. Representativeness-based recall, the idea that individuals recall distinctive group
types, can be viewed as an instance of what Kahneman and Tversky call “attribute substitu-
tion”. When dealing with the difficult question “what is the distribution of hair color among
the Irish?”, people intuitively answer to the simpler question “which hair color distinguishes
the Irish people?”. Critically, as discussed by Kahneman and Tversky, attribute substitution
does not occur because people misunderstand the original question, or mechanically confuse
the assessment of Pr(t |G) with that of Pr(G |t). Rather, it occurs because the distinctive or
representative types immediately come to mind, and individuals anchor their overall proba-
bility judgment to it. As a consequence, subjects do not only make mistakes in judging the
probability that a Floridian is over 65. They also give too high an answer to the question
“what is the average age of a Floridian?"12
One interesting question is whether the process of stereotyping we describe is optimal in
some sense. Focusing mental representations on a few types can be justified by the costs
of thinking or retrieval. This approach, however, is not enough to explain why individuals
should focus on representative rather than likely types. We do not formally analyze the op-
timality of representativeness here, but mention some relevant considerations from cognitive
psychology. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) stress the similarity between many perceptual
and cognitive operations. For instance, the highlight of contrast – a key principle of visual
perception – is invoked to justify the Prospect Theory assumption that the carriers of utility
12Indeed, in many cases mere confusion of Pr(t |G ) with Pr(G |t ) would not yield the phenomenon of
stereotyping. In the Irish hair color example, the probability of being Irish conditional on having red hair is:
Pr(Irish |red ) = Pr(red |Irish ) Pr(Irish)
Pr(red |Irish ) Pr(Irish) + Pr(red |Non Irish ) Pr(Non Irish) .
This probability is clearly very small, given that the Irish population is a tiny fraction of the world population.
Confusion of Pr(t |G ) with Pr(G |t ) would in this case lead to an understatement of the probability of the
red haired Irish.
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are changes relative to a reference point. The same logic applies to our model, in which
stereotypes precisely highlight the contrast between groups.
In visual perception, assessing properties such as brightness, color, size, or distance to an
object by comparing them to other proximate objects has been shown to be optimal in the
presence of multiplicative background noise (Kersten et al. 2004, Cunningham 2013). Our
formulation of representativeness is related to the same idea, in the sense that individuals
estimating properties of one group stress differences from another group. In a noisy world
in which attention is limited, this process may optimally allow for swift reactions to changes
in group characteristics, even if errors are sometimes made.13 Exploring this idea formally
is an interesting avenue for future work.
Consider now some limitations of our model. First, representativeness is not the only
heuristic that shapes recall. Decision makers may for instance find it easier to recall types
that are sufficiently likely. Another potentially important mechanism is availability, under-
stood by Kahneman and Tversky (1972) as the “ease” with which information comes to mind
(because of actual frequency or repetition). In Online Appendix E we present a truncation-
based recall mechanism in which distortions are driven by a combination of representative-
ness and likelihood of types (which is equivalent to relaxing property 1 in Definition 2). This
model can offer a useful starting point to capture availability as well, even though a full
model of availability is beyond the scope of this paper. Even in this more general setting,
the influence of representativeness on recall is the driving force of stereotypes that, in line
with the social psychology perspective, are based on underlying differences among groups.
As we show in Section 4, this feature is critical in accounting for the evidence.
The second set of model-related issues concerns how to specify the elements of Definition
1 in applications: group G, the type space T , and the reference group −G. Take the
specification of the group G and of the type space T . Often, the problem itself provides a
natural specification of these features. This is the case in the empirically important class
of “closed end” questions, such as those used in surveys, which provide respondents with
13To give a simple example, suppose that – as in the case of Proposition 3 – the variance in the environment
increases, in the sense that extreme tail events become more likely. Then, a likelihood-based stereotype would
detect no change while a representativeness based stereotype would focus on the heightened probability of
the tails. In particular, an asymmetric increase in tail probabilities that shifts the mean would be detected
by a representativeness-based stereotype, even if the distribution’s mode does not change.
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a set of alternatives, as in the data we use in Section 4. More generally, the problem
solved by the decision maker – such as evaluating the resume of a job applicant coming
from a certain ethnic group – primes a group, a dimension of interest, and a set of types
(e.g., the applicant’s qualification or skill levels). When types have a natural order, such
as income, age, or education, the granularity of T is also naturally given by the problem
(income, age, and years of schooling brackets). When the set of types is not specified by the
problem, decision makers spontaneously generate one.14 It would be useful to have a model
of which dimensions and types come to mind, particularly for more open ended problems.
Psychologists have sought to construct a theory of natural types and dimensions (Rosch
1998). We do not make a contribution to this problem, but note that in many problems of
interest in economics the dimension as well as the set of types is naturally given. Furthermore,
in our model details of the type space can be important under rank-based truncation, but
they matter less under smooth discounting.
Consider finally the role of the comparison group −G. This group captures the context in
which a stereotype is formed and, again, is often implied by the problem: when G = Floridi-
ans, −G =Rest of US population; when G = African Americans, −G =White Americans. A
distinctive prediction of our model, confirmed by our experiments in Section 4.1, is that the
stereotype for a given group G depends on the comparison group −G.15 When −G is not
pinned down by the problem itself, to derive testable predictions from representativeness, we
set −G = Ω\G where Ω is the natural population over which the unconditional distribution
of types is measured.
14For example, suppose a person is asked to guess the typical occupation of a democratic voter in an “open
ended” format (without being provided with a set of alternatives). Here the level of granularity at which
types are defined is not obvious (e.g. teacher vs a university teacher vs a professor of comparative literature).
15Some empirical papers have taken a similar approach, exogenously varying the natural comparison group
through priming. Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland (2009) show that priming racial or ethnic identity can
impact the risk preferences of participants. Chen et al (2014) find that Asian students cooperate less with
outgroup members when primed with their ethnic identity rather than their university identity. Shih et
al (1999) show that Asian-American women self-stereotype themselves as better or worse in math, with
corresponding impact on performance, when their ethnicity or gender, respectively, is primed. Shih et al
(2006) replicate this effect using a verbal task, documenting that Asian-American women performed better
when their gender rather than their ethnicity was primed. While the generalizability and replicability of
priming has been doubted (Klein et al 2014), this body of evidence is consistent with context dependence.
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3 Properties of Stereotypes
We now study stereotypical beliefs and their accuracy. To illustrate the role of represen-
tativeness, we first ask to what extent the most representative type is a good fit for the
group, namely whether it is modal. Next, we assess the accuracy of the entire stereotypical
distribution. To do so, we focus on a cardinal types and compare the stereotype’s mean and
variance to the true ones.
3.1 Likely vs Unlikely Exemplars
The most representative type for a group is the one that agents most easily recall and
associate with the group itself, for instance a red-haired Irishman or a 65+ year old Floridian.
Social psychologists call this type the exemplar of the group. Accordingly, we define:
Definition 3 A type t∗ is an exemplar for G given comparison group −G when:
t∗ ∈ arg max
t
pit,G
pit,−G
.
Under any specification of the weighting function ht in Definition 2, overweighting (weakly)
increases as we move toward more representative types, so the exemplar is also the type
whose probability is overweighted the most.16 By analyzing the exemplar, then, we can
gauge whether representativeness induces the DM to overweight a likely type (as it happens
standard models of categorical thinking) or an unlikely type. When overweighting occurs in
unlikely and extreme types, the biases of stereotypes can be particularly severe.17
Equation (2) yields the following characterization.
Proposition 1 Suppose the conditional distributions piG and pi−G are not identical. Con-
sider two extreme cases:
16Consider the function h(·) from Definition 2. When applied to more more representative types, the
first argument of the function increases, while one of the other T − 1 arguments decreases. As a result the
weighting factor ht (and thus overweighing pistt,G/pit,G) increases as well.
17In the rank-based truncation model, the frequency of the exemplar provides a measure of stereotype
accuracy. By accuracy, we mean the extent to which the stereotype minimizes the distance
∑
t(pi
st
t,G−pit,G)2.
When d = 1 and only one type is recalled (there are no ties), accuracy is maximized if the exemplar is the
most likely type and minimized if the exemplar is the least likely type.
14
i) If for all t, t′ ∈ T we have that pit,G > pit′,G if and only if pit,−G > pit′,−G, then the modal
type is not an exemplar for at least one group.
ii) If for all t, t′ ∈ T we have that pit,G > pit′,G if and only if pit,−G < pit′,−G, then for each
group the modal type is the exemplar.
Case i) says that when groups have similar distributions, in the sense of having the
same likelihood ranking, the most representative type is unlikely for at least one group,
potentially for both. Representativeness draws the DM’s attention to group differences,
neglecting the fact that the groups are similar, and have the same mode. This mechanism
generates inaccurate stereotypes and is illustrated by the Florida example. This result holds
under any measure of representativeness that differentiates the two groups (for instance, the
difference pit,G − pit,−G).
Case ii) says that the most representative type tends to be likely for both groups when
the distributions are very different. In this case, groups differ the most around their modes,
so representativeness and likelihood coincide. Thinking of Swedes as “blond haired” and
Europeans as “dark haired” is accurate precisely because these are majority traits of the
Swedish and European populations, respectively. In these cases, stereotyping yields fairly
reliable models. Of course, there is still some inaccuracy. Even in the case of likely exemplars,
judgment errors can be significant. For instance, voters in some U.S. states are perceived as
“blue” or “red” because a majority of the population indeed votes Democrat or Republican.
In reality, even in “blue” states, far from everyone votes Democrat. In the 2012 Presidential
election, vote shares of either candidate in most states ranged from 40% to 60%.18
When DMs strongly overweight representative types, the most severe biases occur when
those types are unlikely and extreme. This is true both under rank based truncations and
under smooth discounting functions (see Section 3.2). Ethnic stereotypes based on crime or
terrorism exhibit this error: they neglect the fact that by far the most common types in all
groups are honest and peaceful.
18See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_election,_2012, section on votes by
electoral college.
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3.2 Stereotypical Moments
We now characterize how the first two moments of a distribution are distorted by the process
of stereotyping. To do so, we must restrict our analysis to cardinal, ordered types. The
following results hold for any weighting function ht(·) satisfying Definition 2. We consider
two canonical cases that prove useful in illustrating the predictions of the model.
In the first case, groups G and −G are such that the likelihood ratio pit,G/pit,−G is mono-
tonic in t. The monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) holds to a first approximation
in many empirical settings and is also assumed in many economic models, such as standard
agency models.19 If pit,G/pit,−G is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in t, then group G is
associated with higher (lower) values of t relative to the comparison group −G. Formally:
Proposition 2 Suppose that MLRP holds, and assume w.l.o.g. that the likelihood ratio pit,G
pit,−G
is strictly increasing in t. Then, for any weighting function ht(·) that is not constant in the
relevant range:
Est(t|G) > E(t|G) > E(t |−G) > Est(t| −G).
Under MLRP, the most representative part of the distribution for G is the right tail if
pit,G/pit,−G increases in t or the left tail if pit,G/pit,−G decreases in t. The representative tail
is then overweighted while the non-representative tail is underweighted. As a consequence,
the assessed mean Est(t|G) is too extreme in the direction of the representative tail.
Critically, in line with the social cognition perspective, the stereotype contains a kernel
of truth: the DM overestimates the mean of G if this group has a higher mean than the
comparison group, namely E (t |G) > E (t |−G) and conversely if E (t |G) < E (t |−G). The
DM exaggerates this true difference because he inflates the association of G with its most
representative types.20 For instance, when judging an asset manager who performs well,
19Examples include the Binomial and the Poisson families of distributions with different parameters. The
characterisation of distributions satisfying MLRP is easier in the case of continuous distributions, see Online
Appendix D: two distributions f(x), f(x− θ) that differ only in their mean satisfy MLRP if and only if the
distribution f(x) is log-concave. Examples include the Exponential and Normal distributions. To the extent
that discrete distributions sufficiently approximate these distributions (as the Poisson distribution Pois(λ)
approximates the Normal distribution N(λ, λ) for large λ), they will also satisfy MLRP.
20Depending on the distribution and the weighing function, the DM’s assessment of the variance Var(t|G)
may also be dampened relative to the truth. This is often true under the truncation weighing function. In
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we tend to over-emphasize skill relative to luck because higher skill levels are relatively
more associated with higher performance. This occurs even if for both skilled and unskilled
managers high performance is mostly due to luck.
In the second case for which we charaterize the stereotypical distributions, groups G and
−G have the same mean E (t |G) = E (t |−G) = E (t) but differ in their variance. We abstract
from skewness and higher moments by considering distributions (pit,G)t∈T and (pit,−G)t∈T that
share the same support and are both symmetric around the median/mean E (t).
Proposition 3 Suppose that in G more extreme types are relatively more frequent than
in −G. Formally, the likelihood ratio pit,G
pit,−G
is U-shaped in t around E(t). Then, for any
weighting function ht(·) that is not constant in the relevant range, stereotypical beliefs satisfy:
V arst(t|G) > V ar(t|G) > V ar(t| −G) > V arst(t| −G),
Est(t|G) = Est(t| −G) = E(t).
When group G has a higher relative prevalence of extreme types, its representative types
are located at both extremes of the distribution. The DM’s beliefs about G are then formed
by overweighting both tails while underweighting the unrepresentative middle. The over-
weighting of G’s tails causes the assessment of its variance V arst(t|G) to be too high. For
example, the skill distribution of immigrants to the US may be perceived as having very fat
tails, or even bimodal, with immigrants being perceived as either unskilled or very skilled
relative to the native population. The mean of the group, in contrast, is assessed cor-
rectly, because the stereotypical distribution remains symmetric around E(t). As before, the
stereotype contains a kernel of truth. It induces the agent to exaggerate the true differences
between groups, namely the higher variance of G relative to its counterpart.
We present a number of extensions of the model in the Online Appendix. We first consider
multi-dimensional type spaces, and show that stereotypes center around the dimension where
groups differ the most, in line with the kernel of truth logic (Appendix C). Multidimensional
this case, stereotyping effectively leads to a form of overconfidence in which the DM both holds extreme
views and overestimates the precision of his assessment. That extreme views and overconfidence (in the
sense of over precision) go together has been documented in the setting of political ideology, among others
(Ortoleva and Snowberg 2015).
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stereotypes imply that the dimension we think about is influenced by context dependent. For
example, the Irish are stereotyped as red-haired when compared to the European population.
However, when compared to the Scots, a more plausible stereotype for the Irish is “Catholic”
because religion is the dimension along which Irish and Scots differ the most.
In Appendix D we extend the model to continuous type spaces. Many settings of interest
in economics can be usefully described by continuous probability distributions, and we show
our model is particularly tractable in this case. In Appendix E, we relax Definition 2 and
allow weighting of types to also be influenced by their likelihood. We show that the basic
insight that stereotypes contain a kernel of truth carries through to these cases as well.
To summarise, the psychology of representativeness yields stereotypes that are consis-
tent with the social cognition approach in which individuals assess groups by recalling and
focusing on distinctive group traits. When there are systematic differences between groups,
stereotypes get the direction right, but exaggerate differences.
3.3 Some Examples
A growing body of field and experimental evidence points to a widespread belief that
women are worse than men at mathematics (Eccles, Jacobs, and Harold 1990, Guiso, Monte,
Sapienza and Zingales 2008, Carrell, Page and West 2010). This belief persists despite the
fact that, for decades, women have been gaining ground in average school grades, including
mathematics, and have recently surpassed men in overall school performance (Goldin, Katz
and Kuziemko 2006, Hyde et al 2008). This belief, shared by both men and women (Reuben,
Sapienza and Zingales 2014), may help account, in part, for the gender gap in the choices of
high school tracks, of college degrees and of careers, with women disproportionately choos-
ing humanities and health related areas (Weinberger 2005, Buser, Niederle and Oosterbeek
2014) and foregoing significant wage premiums to quantitative skills (Bertrand 2011).
Gender stereotypes in mathematics, particularly beliefs that exaggerate the extent of
average differences, are consistent with the predictions of our model. The fact that men
are over-representated at the very highest performance levels leads a stereotypical thinker
to exaggerate the magnitude of mean differences. Figure I shows the score distributions
from the mathematics section of 2013’s Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), for both men and
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women.21 The distributions are very similar, with average scores being slightly higher for
men (531 versus 499 out of 800). However, scores for men have a heavier right tail, with
men twice as likely to have a perfect SAT math score than women.22 In light of such data,
the stereotypical male performance in mathematics is high, while the stereotypical female
performance is poor. Predictions based on such stereotypes are inaccurate, exaggerating true
differences. Consistent with this prediction, experimental evidence shows that both genders
underestimate women’s ability in simple math tasks, even controlling for past performance
(Reuben et al. 2014). Coffman (2014) shows a similar pattern extends to confidence about
own ability in other male-typed domains, with women reporting significantly less confidence
in gender-incongruent than gender-congruent tasks. Our model suggests that these patterns
might come from stereotypes based on gender differences in the right tail of the distribu-
tion. While differences in the right tail of the distribution are unlikely to be relevant for
most decisions, stereotypical thinking driven by these differences has the potential to impact
economically-important decisions, whether through self-stereotyping (i.e., choice of careers
or majors as in Buser, Niederle, Osterbeek 2014) or through discrimination (i.e., hiring
decisions as in Bohnet, van Geen, and Bazerman 2015).
Figure I here
The logic of exaggerated, yet directionally correct, stereotypes can also shed light on the
well documented phenomenon of base rate neglect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). Indeed,
Proposition 2 implies that the DM overreacts to information that assigns people to groups,
precisely because such information generates extreme stereotypes. Consider the classic ex-
ample in which a medical test for a particular disease with a 5% prevalence has a 90% rate
of true positives and a 5% rate of false positives. The test assigns each person to one of
two groups, + (positive test) or − (negative test). The DM estimates the frequency of the
21Standardized test performance measures not only innate ability but also effort and investment by third
parties, Hyde et al (2008). The mapping of test performance into inferences about innate ability is an issue
not addressed by our model.
22For 2013 SATMathematics scores, see http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/research/SAT-
Percentile-Ranks-By-Gender-Ethnicity-2013.pdf. Results are similar for the National Assessment of Educa-
tional Progress (NAEP), which are more representative of the overall population. For 2012 NAEP scores
for 17 year olds in mathematics, see http://nationsreportcard.gov/ltt_2012/age17m.aspx. See Hyde et al
(2008), Fryer and Levitt (2010), and Pope and Sydnor (2010) for in-depth empirical analyses of the gender
gap in mathematics.
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sick type (s) and the healthy type (h) in each group. The test is informative: a positive
result increases the relative likelihood of sickness, and a negative result increases the relative
likelihood of health for any prior. Formally:
Pr(+|s)
Pr(+|h) > 1 >
Pr(−|s)
Pr(−|h) . (4)
This condition has clear implications: the representative person who tests positive is sick,
while the representative person who tests negative is healthy. Following Proposition 2, the
DM reacts to the test by moving his priors too far in the right direction, generating extreme
stereotypes. He greatly boosts his assessment that a positively tested person is sick, but
also that a negatively tested person is healthy. Because most people are healthy, the DM’s
assessment about the group that tested negative is fairly accurate but is severely biased for
the group that tested positive. This analysis formalises Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983)
verbal account of base rate neglect.23
The same mechanism may underlie several other instances where decision makers over-
weight diagnostic information. When assessing an employee’s skill level, an employer at-
tributes high performance to high skill, because high performance is the distinctive mark
of a talented employee. Because he neglects the possibility that some talented employees
perform poorly and that some non-talented ones perform well (perhaps due to stochasticity
in the environment), the employer has too much faith in skill, and neglects the role of luck in
accounting for the output. Similarly, when assessing the performance of firms in a hot sector
of the economy (e.g. G = internet), an investor recalls highly successful firms in that sector
(t = return of Google, Amazon, etc.). However, he neglects the possibility of firms being
unsuccessful, because lack of success is statistically non-diagnostic, and psychologically non-
23Our account is distinct from a mechanical underweighting of base-rates in Bayes rule, as in Grether
(1980) and Bodoh-Creed, Benjamin and Rabin (2013). In those models, upon receiving the test results, the
DM can update his beliefs in the wrong direction: he can be less confident that a person is healthy after a
negative test than under his prior, which cannot happen in our model.
While this prediction of our model seems consistent with introspection, we are not aware of experimental
evidence on this point. Griffin and Tversky (1992) present evidence consistent with pure neglect of base
rates, but in a significantly different task, namely inferring the bias of a coin from a history of coin flips.
Such experiments are hard to compare with the predictions of our model, because subjects are asked to
generate distributions of different numbers of coin flips in their minds, which is a much more involved task
than to recall types of a given distribution. Their assessments, then, might be wrong for other reasons. See
Bodoh-Creed, Benjamin and Rabin (2013) for a detailed discussion.
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representative, of a growing sector – even if it is likely. This causes both excessive optimism
(in that the expectation of growth is unreasonably high) and overconfidence (in that the
variability in earnings growth considered possible is truncated). True, the hot sector may
have better growth opportunities on average, but representativeness exaggerates this feature
and induces the investor to neglect a significant risk of failure.
4 Evidence on Representativeness and Stereotypes
Testing our model requires evaluating the beliefs individuals hold about a target group
against the true distribution of that target group over an attribute space. An ideal data
set would consist of naturally defined groups with known distributions over a given space of
types, and a corresponding set of beliefs about the distribution of each group over that space
of types. This would allow us to test for exaggeration of true differences between groups
and to ask whether this exaggeration is well-predicted by overweighting of representative
types. To identify a causal role for representativeness or context dependence, we would need
exogenous variation in either the comparison group, −G, or in the distributions over the
type spaces. This is unavailable in existing data sets. Accordingly, we take a two-pronged
approach. First, we create a controlled laboratory environment that allows us to induce
the exogenous variation in representative types that we need to test causality, and second,
we re-analyze existing field evidence to check for consistency with our predictions. To our
knowledge, the prediction that representativeness generates context dependence has not been
tested before.
In testing our model, we focus on the two main implications of representativeness-based
stereotypes:
• Context dependence: the stereotype of a target group depends on the characteristics
of the reference group it is compared to.
• Kernel of truth: stereotypes depend on group characteristics, and – in most (precisely
characterized) settings – are slanted toward representative types.
We test the first property with a lab experiment (Section 4.1). We then turn to survey
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data on beliefs about U.S. political groups (Section 4.2) for an empirical analysis that ex-
plores the second property. The survey data is more tightly linked to our interest in social
stereotypes. The laboratory experiment, however, allows us to directly test the role of repre-
sentativeness in generating context dependent beliefs. Online Appendices F and G provide
all details, and additional results, for the experiments and field evidence.
4.1 Lab Evidence on Representativeness and Context Dependence
The influence of the representativeness heuristic on recall and on beliefs has been extensively
documented in the lab (Kahneman and Tversky 1972, 1983). Our goal here is to consider
how representativeness as formalized in Equation (2) gives rise to context dependent beliefs.
To our knowledge, the possibility that representativeness may generate context dependence
has not been tested before.
To assess this prediction, we perform a controlled laboratory experiment that allows
us to isolate representativeness from many confounding factors – historical, sociological, or
otherwise – that may affect stereotype formation in the real world. We construct our own
groups of ordinary objects, creating a target group, G, and a comparison group, −G. We
hold the target group G fixed, but explore how participant impressions of it change as we
change the comparison group −G, and hence representativeness.
We conducted several experiments, in the laboratory as well as on Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Each involves a basic three-step design. First, participants are shown the target group
and a randomly-assigned comparison group for 15 seconds. In this time, differences between
groups can be noticed but the groups’ precise compositions cannot be memorized. The
second step consists of a few filler questions, which briefly draw the participants’ cognitive
bandwidth away from their observation. Finally, participants are asked to assess the groups
they saw. Participants are incentivized to provide accurate answers.
We randomly assign participants to either the Control or the Representativeness condi-
tion. In the Control condition, G and −G have nearly identical distributions, so that all
types are similarly representative for each group. In the Representativeness condition, −G
is changed in such a way that a certain type becomes very representative for G. Context
dependence implies that the assessment of G should now overweight this representative type,
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even though the distribution of G itself has not changed.
We ran six experiments of this form, with design changes focused on reducing participant
confusion and removing confounds. Here, we describe the final, and most refined, version
of these experiments. In an attempt to provide a overview of the results while remaining
concise, we also provide the results from pooled specifications that use all data collected. In
Online Appendix F, we present additional details and report all experiments conducted. We
also provide instructions and materials for each experiment and the full data set.
Consider first the experiment illustrated in Figure II. A group of 25 cartoon girls is
presented next to a group of 25 cartoon boys in t-shirts of different colors: blue, green,
or purple. In the Control condition, Fig.IIa, the groups have identical color distributions
(13 purple, 12 green), so no color is representative of either group. The Representativeness
condition, Fig.IIb, compares the same group of girls with a different group of boys, for whom
green shirts are replaced by blue shirts. Now only girls wear green and only boys wear blue.
These colors, while still not the most frequent for either group, are now most representative.
For each group, girls and boys, participants are asked a number of questions concerning the
frequency of T-shirts of different colors worn by that group.
Applying our model, in the control condition the type space is T = {green, purple},
and the groups are G = girls, and −G = boys. Given that the color distributions are
identical across groups, both types are equally representative, pigreen,girls/pigreen,boys = 1 =
pipurple,girls/pipurple,boys. As a result, assessment of G should be on average correct, pist,controlgreen,girls =
pigreen,girls and pist,controlpurple,girls = pipurple,girls for any weighing function (and the same is true about
assessments of −G).
In the treatment condition, the distribution of shirt colors remains the same for girls. For
boys, green shirts are changed into blue. Thus, the type space changes to T = {green, purple, blue}
and the representative color for girls becomes green, pigreen,girls/pigreen,boys = ∞ > 1 =
pipurple,girls/pipurple,boys, while that for buys becomes blue. As a result, in the treatment condi-
tion subjects should inflate the frequency of green shirts relative to the truth, pist,treatmentgreen,girls >
pigreen,girls (and the same should happen to assessments of blue shirts for boys). We also ex-
pect the assessed frequency of green shirts to go up relative to the control condition, namely
pist,treatmentgreen,girls > pi
st,control
green,girls. Critically, the only factor that varies across treatments is the rep-
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resentativeness of the 12-color shirt. Thus, if we see differences across conditions, the causal
role of representativeness-based recall in shaping group judgments is clear.24
Figure II here
We collected data from 301 participants using this T-shirts design.25 Since the number
of green and purple shirts is very similar, we first ask subject the simplest question of which
shirt color is modal. Next, we ask subjects to assess the share of green and purple shirts.
Consistent with the role of representativeness, participants assigned to the Representa-
tiveness condition are 10.5 percentage points more likely to recall the less frequent color,
green for girls or blue for boys, as the modal color when it is representative of a group (35%
of participants guess the less frequent color is modal in the Control condition, this propor-
tion increases to 46% in the Representativeness condition, p=0.01, estimated from a probit
regression reported in Appendix F).
Let us now turn to subjects’ estimates of how many T-shirts of each color they saw in
each group. In both conditions, the true difference in counts is one (13 purple shirts, 12 green
or blue shirts). In the Control condition, participants on average believe they saw 0.54 more
purple shirts than green or blue shirts. In the Representativeness condition, participants
believe they saw 0.72 fewer purple shirts than green or blue shirts (the across treatment
difference is significant with p=0.01 from OLS regression reported in Appendix F).
In total, we collected data for six experiments of this general structure, gathering evidence
from more than 1,000 participants. As we describe in Appendix F, while there is substantial
variation across experiments, when we pool all data collected we find significant aggregate
treatment effects in line with a role of representativeness in judgment. We employ four
different unordered types designs, similar to the T-shirts experiment, using six samples (four
online and two in the laboratory) with 741 participants. We find effects in the predicted
direction for five of the six samples. Using a probit regression that pools all of the data for
24We vary which colors are used in which roles across participants. Some participants saw this particular
color distribution, while others see, for example, green as the modal color, with purple as the diagnostic color
for boys in the Rep. condition and blue as the diagnostic color for girls in the Rep. condition. We vary the
colors across the roles to avoid confounding the characteristics of any particular color with its diagnosticity.
25Throughout our analysis, we exclude any participant who participated in a previous version of the
experiment and any participant who self-identified as color blind. In Appendix F, we show that our results
are unchanged if we include these additional observations.
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these unordered type experiments, we find that participants are 9.3 percentage points more
likely to guess that the less frequent type is modal when it is representative than when it is
not (p=0.002). We also run a family of ordered types experiments (two designs, five samples,
402 participants). Unlike the simpler T-shirts style design, the theoretical predictions for
the ordered types designs are more sensitive to the specific assumptions one makes about
the weighting function of the decision-maker.26 We find effects in the predicted direction
for three of the fives samples. As we discuss in more detail in Appendix F, the ordered
types results vary by platform, with consistently stronger results on Amazon Mechanical
Turk than in the laboratory samples. Pooling all ordered types experiments, participants
are 9.3 percentage points more likely to guess that the group of interest has a greater average
than the comparison group when the right tail is representative (p=0.062). Given our simple
experimental setting with groups of mundane objects, we interpret our results – a significant
and reasonably-sized impact on average beliefs – as an important proof of concept: the
presence of representative types biases ex post assessment.
4.2 Empirical Evidence on Political Stereotypes
We examine two data sets on political preferences, and beliefs about political preferences, in
the U.S. We investigate the roles of representativeness and context dependence by separately
testing for hypotheses that allow us to assess the leading theories of stereotypes.
First, we test whether beliefs are correct or depart systematically from the truth. The
statistical discrimination approach builds on the assumption that people hold rational ex-
pectations of group traits. Comparing beliefs to the truth allows us to assess the validity of
this assumption in our data.
Second, we test if beliefs depart from the truth by exaggerating (mean) differences among
groups, as per the kernel of truth hypothesis. This is an implicit test of context dependence,
because it implies that beliefs about the target groups are shaped not only by that group’s
characteristics, but also by those of the reference group.27
26This is in part due to our choice to not study MLRP distributions. We motivate and discuss this design
decision in Appendix F.
27Of course, unlike in the laboratory experiment, in this setting we cannot test for context dependence by
exogenously varying the reference group.
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Third, we test if distortions in beliefs can be accounted for by the overweighting of highly
representative types (defined as types that are relatively more frequent in the target relative
to the reference group). The second and third tests address the key predictions of our model.
4.2.1 The data
We have two data sets on political preferences and beliefs about political preferences. The
first data set, from Graham et al (GNH 2012), contains data from the Moral Foundations
Questionnaire. Respondents (1,174 self-identified liberals and 500 self-identified conserva-
tives) answer questions about their position on a subset of 45 issues: 20 moral relevance
statements (e.g., “when you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent
are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?”) and 25 moral judgments (e.g.,
“indicate the extent to which you would agree or disagree”). For each issue, a randomly de-
termined subset of participants states their own position, another subset states their belief
on the position of a “typical liberal”, and a third subset states their belief on the position
of a “typical conservative”. The data thus includes the distribution over positions for both
liberal and conservatives, as well as the average believed typical position of liberals and of
conservatives, on each of the 45 issues. Each position is elicited on 1 - 6 scale.
The second data set comes from the American National Election Survey (ANES), and
contains data from more than 20,000 respondents between 1964 and 2012.28 The survey
covers political issues of the day, such as the optimal amount of government spending and
service provision (1984 through 2000), or the proper place of women in society (1972 through
1998). We focus on the 10 issues that ask participants to respond on a multi-point, 1 to 7,
scale (rather than just indicate binary agreement or disagreement); each of these 10 issues
is asked in multiple years. Participants are asked to provide their own position on the scale
and their believed position of the Democratic and Republican party (“Where would you
place the Democratic (Republican) party on this scale?”). The data includes, for each issue-
year observation, the distribution of participant positions for both self-identified liberals and
self-identified conservatives, as well as the distribution of believed typical positions of the
28This data is publicly available at http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes
_timeseries_cdf/anes_timeseries_cdf.htm.
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Democratic and Republican Parties.
4.2.2 Empirical strategy and results
Our analysis focuses on beliefs about two groups, Conservatives and Liberals. The types are
the possible positions for each issue (1, 2, ... , 6, 7). For the GNH data, we interpret beliefs
about the “typical” element of a group to coincide with the believed average position in
that group. Similarly, for the ANES data we use the believed party positions as a proxy for
believed mean of each group.29 We then take as a benchmark the hypothesis that individuals
hold accurate beliefs about each group, and in particular that believed mean position should
equal true mean position, at least on average across subjects. The accurate beliefs hypothesis
underlies the most common economic model of stereotyping, statistical discrimination.
To assess our representativeness-based model, we perform a regression exercise. To test
our model in a linear regression framework, we rely on linear approximations of the weighting
function. Our model then yields two regression specifications.
Proposition 4 Let G ∈ {conservative, liberal}, and let ht ≡ h (pit,G/pit,−G) be a differen-
tiable and strictly increasing weighting function as in Definition 2. The following hold as a
first order approximation around identical distributions piG/pi−G = 1.
1) Kernel of truth regression. There exists a constant κ > 0 such that:
Est(t|G) = E(t|G) (1 + κ)− κ · E(t| −G). (5)
2) Representativeness regression. Denote H = {T − 2, . . . , T} the right tail of types
and RconsH =
∑
H pit,cons/
∑
H pit,lib as the average representativeness of right tail types for
29This assumption is consistent with the authors’ interpretation of the GNH data (GNH 2012) and with
previous studies using ANES (e.g., Westfall et al, WBCJ 2015). Furthermore, to the extent that this
assumption holds equally well for most issues within a data set, our focus on across-issue differences should
allow us to test the predictions of our model even with an imperfect proxy for beliefs of mean positions.
Finally, the data provides some insight into whether subjects are reporting (perceived) modal or mean types.
As we show below, the modal type is a poor prediction of stated beliefs, while a distorted mean slanted
towards representative types is an accurate prediction of stated beliefs.
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conservatives. Under the further approximation where pit,cons
pit,lib
≈ RconsH for t ∈ H:
Est(t|cons) = E(t|cons) + λcons (RconsH − 1) , (6)
Est(t|lib) = E(t|lib)− λlib (RconsH − 1) , (7)
where λcons and λlib are positive constants.
The first regression allows us to test for the kernel of truth hypothesis, while the second
set of regressions allows us to test for the role of representativeness.
Equation (5) says that respondents in our model inflate the average position of a group,
say the conservatives, if and only if the group has a higher average position than the other
group, namely the liberals. Formally, Est(t|cons) > E(t|cons) if and only if E(t|cons) >
E(t|lib). Because in our measurement scale higher types mean “more conservative”, we ex-
pect: i) believed conservative average to be higher than the truth, and ii) the extent of
overstatement to decrease in the average liberal position E(t|lib). Conversely, we expect
the average liberal position to be lower than the truth, the more so the higher the average
conservative position E(t|cons).
As previously discussed, the basis of these predictions is context dependence: information
about the distribution of −G is relevant for the beliefs about G. This context dependence is
inconsistent with rational expectations, in which only the group’s own means should affect
beliefs. We test the hypothesis that the true mean E(t|G) is a significant predictor of the
believed mean Est(t|G) with a positive sign, while the other group’s true mean E(t| −G) is
a predictor of the believed mean with a negative sign.
Equations (6) and (7) say that repondents’ assessment bias is shaped by representa-
tiveness. When the right tail is more representative for conservatives (RconsH − 1 posi-
tive and large), participants should inflate the average conservative position more (higher
Est(t|cons) − E(t|cons)) and deflate the average liberal position more (lower Est(t|lib) −
E(t|lib)). We test the hypothesis that the inflation in conservative positions is positively as-
sociated with the representativeness of the right tail for the conservatives, while the inflation
in liberal positions is negatively associated with it. Once again, the representativeness of the
right tail is computed using the true distribution of positions.
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In Equations (6) and (7), in many cases the representative tail is also the most likely one.
As a consequence, these tests cannot distinguish a representativeness-based from a likelihood-
based model of distorted beliefs. We perform two additional tests. First, we run versions of
Equations (6) and (7) in which we control for the likelihood of tails (see Table A4 in Online
Appendix G). Second, we compute numerically the predictions of a representativeness-based
model of stereotypes and of a likelihood-based model of stereotypes. We then assess which
of these two is better able to match the data on beliefs.
4.2.3 Empirical Results
To begin, we illustrate the structure of the data and the nature of our predictions with two
simple examples from the GNH data set, focusing on beliefs about conservatives. In Example
1, participants are asked about their agreement with the statement, “It can never be right
to kill a human being”. In Example 2, participants are asked about the moral relevance
of “whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable”. As can be seen in
Figure III, in Example 1 the modal position (Strongly Disagree (1)) and most representative
positions (Strongly Disagree (1)) coincide for conservatives. In contrast, in Example 2 in
Figure III, the most representative types (Slightly Relevant (3), Not at all Relevant (1)) are
not most likely for the conservative group. Following Proposition 1, we predict that beliefs
will be distorted in the direction of the most representative types. Thus, we expect more
exaggeration in Example 2 than in Example 1, since in Example 2 the most representative
types (in the left tail) are far from the modal type, while in Example 1, they coincide. This
is what we find: the conservative position is exaggerated by only 0.09 positions in Example
1 (true mean 2.99, believed mean 2.90), but by 1.06 positions in Example 2 (true mean 4.21,
believed mean 3.15).
Figure III here
In the full data sets, we treat each (issue, year) pair as an observation, and we cluster
standard errors at the issue level. For the GNH data, we have 45 observations: 45 issues
each measured in the same year. For the ANES data, we have 66 observations: 10 issues,
each measured in multiple years. To begin, we simply document systematic exaggeration in
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both data sets. This is a primary focus of the original analysis in GNH (2012), and also in
WBCJ (2015)’s analysis of the ANES data.30 Figure IV shows that the believed difference
between typical conservative and typical liberal positions is larger than the true difference
in mean positions for 109 of the 111 observations. The data for both GNH (purple squares)
and ANES (orange triangles) lie above the 45 degree line (dashed).31 Average exaggeration
is 0.62 positions on the scale (0.66 in the GNH data, 0.59 in the ANES data).32
Figure IV here.
The systematic and significant exaggeration of mean differences suggests that the bench-
mark model of accurate beliefs is missing something important. Indeed, this exaggeration
reflects the fact that believed means are typically more extreme than true means. First, note
that the Kernel of truth regression (Equation 5) generates exaggeration of mean differences,
just as documented in Figure IV:
Est(t|G)− Est(t| −G) = (1 + 2κ) · [E(t|G)− E(t| −G)]
To bring this prediction to the data, we regress the believed mean position for each group,
EB(t|G), on the true mean of the group, E(t|G), and the true mean of the comparison group,
E(t| −G), across issues. We do this for each group (liberals, conservatives) in each data set
separately. We also present pooled specifications which combine the data sets to make a
prediction for a given group (liberals, conservatives). In these pooled specifications, we
include a dummy variable indicating whether the observation came from the ANES data set.
For all specifications, we cluster observations at the issue level.33 The results from regression
are shown in Table I. In every specification, we find that E(t|G) is a significant predictor
of EB(t|G) with the predicted positive sign. Crucially, for five of the six specifications, the
30Chambers and Melnyk (2006) also find evidence of exaggeration of true differences in beliefs about
political positions.
31For convenience, we recode all issues so that the high end of the scale (6,7) represents the stereotypically
more conservative position.
32A natural question to ask is how beliefs vary across liberals and conservatives. That is, do beliefs about
a group G depend on membership in G versus −G. Our model does not speak to this issue. However, in
Appendix G, we show that the results we document below hold for both beliefs held by conservatives and
beliefs held by liberals; see Tables A9, A10, and A11.
33In general, the results presented below for the ANES data are not largely impacted by the decision to
cluster at the issue level. Similar results are obtained if the data are not clustered.
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mean of the comparison group E(t| −G) is a also significant predictor of EB(t|G), with the
predicted negative sign.
Table I here.
While these results provide strong evidence of context dependence and are consistent with
our model, they do not pin down a role for representativeness of types. Our next test relates
the magnitude of representativeness of tail types to the magnitude of belief distortions.
To this end, we implement the regressions in Equations (6, 7). Following Proposition 4, we
compute the average representativeness of tail types for conservatives, RconsH =
∑
t≥T−2 pit,cons∑
t≥T−2 pit,lib
.
We again test the hypothesis that RconsH is a significant predictor of Est(t|cons) with a positive
sign, and a predictor of Est(t|lib) with a negative sign. Table II shows that, conditional
on true mean, RconsH predicts believed mean for each group G as predicted. The first three
specifications display the results for predicting beliefs held about conservatives. In both data
sets, the average representativeness of tail types for conservatives is a significant, positive
predictor of beliefs held about conservatives. The final three specifications display the results
for predicting beliefs held about liberals. We find that the average representativeness of tail
types for conservatives is a negative predictor of beliefs held about liberals. This effect is
significant in the GNH data and marginally significant in the ANES data.
Figure II here.
We present several additional results in the Online Appendix G. To further examine
the role of representativeness in driving beliefs, we first show the results of Table II carry
through when we control for the average likelihood on the tail positions (see Table A4 in
Appendix G). Most tellingly, we use the model to predict beliefs across issues and compare
those to the data. For simplicity, we use the rank-based truncation specification to predict
mean beliefs when stereotypes include the d most representative types, for d = 1, . . . , T . We
compare these predictions to those of a model in which beliefs are obtained by restricting
the distribution to the d most likely types. Our benchmark for both models is predicting the
believed mean from the entire distribution, where d = T . We show that the predictions of
the rank-based truncation model, with d = 4 or 5, compare favorably to both a likelihood-
based truncation model (with any d) and the accurate beliefs benchmark. Interestingly,
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this result suggests that stereotypical beliefs are well approximated by neglecting the least
representative types (as opposed to focusing only on the most representative types), and so
represent a moderate, though systematic, departure from the standard benchmark. Finally,
we show that the results we document above hold for both beliefs held by conservatives and
beliefs held by liberals; see Tables A9, A10, and A11 in Appendix G.
5 Conclusion
We present a model of stereotypical thinking, in which decision makers making predictions
about a group overweight the group’s most distinctive types. These overweighted types are
not the most likely ones given the DM’s data, but rather the most representative ones, in the
sense of being the most diagnostic of the group relative to other groups. Representativeness
implies that what is most distinctive of a group depends on what group it is compared
to. We present experimental evidence that confirms this context dependence in recall-based
assessments of groups. Finally, we evaluated the predictions of the model using political
data from existing large scale surveys. We find context-dependence to be a key feature of
beliefs. Given the richness of the political data, we can go a step further and identify a role
for representativeness in particular. As the representativeness of tail types increases, beliefs
of a group are distorted in the direction of that tail.
Our approach provides a parsimonious and psychologically founded account of how deci-
sion makers generate simplified representations of reality, from social groups to stock returns,
and offers a unified account of disparate pieces of evidence relating to this type of uncer-
tainty. The model captures the central fact that stereotypes highlight the greatest difference
between groups, thus explaining why some stereotypes are very accurate, while others lack
validity. Still, stereotypes often have a “kernel of truth”, when they are based on systematic
– even if small – differences between groups. This same logic allows us to describe a num-
ber of heuristics and psychological biases, many of which arise in the context of prediction
problems. Generically, our model generates overreaction to diagnostic information.
Our model is based on representativeness and does not capture all the features of stereo-
typical thinking. However, it captures perhaps the central feature: when we think of a group,
32
we focus on what is most distinctive about it, and neglect or underweight the rest.
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Table I: Information about -G Predicts Beliefs about G
OLS Predicting Believed Mean of Group G for Each Issue
G = Conservatives G = Liberals
GNH ANES Pooled GNH ANES Pooled
True Mean Position 1.02**** 0.98**** 0.96**** -0.21**** -0.19 -0.25****
of Conservatives (0.097) (0.133) (0.076) (0.060) (0.116) (0.060)
for Issue
True Mean Position -0.35*** -0.86**** -0.58**** 0.987**** 0.39*** 0.73****
of Liberals (0.106) (0.134) (0.131) (0.066) (0.106) (0.135)
for Issue
Constant 1.51*** 3.35**** 2.35**** 0.69**** 2.58**** 1.56****
(0.195) (0.269) (0.279) (0.122) (0.249) (0.270)
R-squared 0.83 0.53 0.66 0.92 0.32 0.68
Obs. (Clusters) 45 (45) 66 (10) 111 (55) 45 (45) 66 (10) 111 (55)
Notes: Std. errors in parentheses, clustered at the issue level. *, **, ***, and **** denote significance
at the 10% level, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. In pooled specifications,
we include a dummy variable indicating whether the observation came from ANES data set.
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Table II: Average Representativeness of Tail Positions Predicts Beliefs
OLS Predicting Believed Mean of Group G for Each Issue
G = Conservatives G = Liberals
GNH ANES Pooled GNH ANES Pooled
True Mean Position 0.78**** 0.24** 0.51**** 0.72**** 0.18*** 0.41****
of Group G for Issue (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10)
RconsH 0.19** 0.55** 0.25*** -0.14** -0.12* -0.24****
Avg. Rep. of Tail Types (0.07) (0.22) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
for Conservatives
Constant 1.01**** 2.60**** 1.84**** 0.93**** 2.71**** 2.01****
(0.26) (0.45) (0.29) (0.22) (0.25) (0.32)
R-squared 0.82 0.48 0.60 0.91 0.31 0.70
Obs. (Clusters) 45 (45) 66 (10) 111 (55) 45 (45) 66 (10) 111 (55)
Notes: Std. errors in parentheses, clustered at the issue level. *, **, ***, and **** denote significance
at the 10% level, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. In pooled specifications, we include a
dummy variable indicating whether the observation came from ANES data set.
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Figure I: SAT Mathematics scores by gender (2013)
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(a) Control Condition (b) Representativeness Condition
Figure II: T-shirts Experiment
43
Figure III: Two Examples
44
Figure IV: Exaggeration of Differences
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